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THE SOLUTION TO NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
DISPUTES: MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION
Braden Shaw*
INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining disputes between players and owners con-
tinue to impede upon the operation and development of the National
Hockey League ("NHL" or "the League").' Such disputes are
lengthy, unnecessary, and prevent the League from generating billions
of dollars in revenue.2 The League has experienced three major work
stoppages within the past eighteen years,3 including the cancellation of
the entire 2004-2005 season.4
The NHL's unprecedented number of labor disputes demonstrates
that the NHL's current collective bargaining negotiation process is un-
workable. While federal mediators have attempted to help resolve
NHL conflicts in the past,5 their potential impact diminishes if the rep-
resentatives of the players and owners are unwilling to cooperate with
one another.6 Therefore, it is time for the NHL to integrate
* Braden Shaw is a 3L J.D. Candidate at DePaul University College of Law. He would like
to thank his parents for their unconditional love and support.
1. Alexandra Baumann, Play Ball: What Can Be Done to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts in
Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights On, 32 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
251, 280-85 (2012) (discussing various NHL work stoppages from 1992 through 2005); Alexan-
der A. Jeglic, Can the New Collective Bargaining Agreement Save the NHL?, 23 ENT. & SPoirs
L. 1, 23-24 (2005) (discussing the 2004-2005 NHL Lockout and details of the changes that were
made to the Collective Bargaining Agreement that was put into place in 2005); James Mirtle,
Measuring the NHL-NHLPA Divide: Oh, About $1-Billion, GLoBE AND MAIL (Sep. 13, 2012),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/globe-on-hockey/measuring-the-nhl-nhlpa-di-
vide-oh-about-1-billion/article4541634/ (discussing the hockey-related revenue division propos-
als of the players and the owners early in the 2012 collective bargaining negotiations).
2. See Baumann, supra note 1; see also Mirtle, supra note 1 (discussing how disagreements
over player contracts, revenue division between players and owners, and player salary con-
straints have impacted the operation of the NHL).
3. See Baumann, supra note 1; see also David Strehle, As 2012 NHL Lockout Nears One
Month Mark, Concerns Grow, SB NATION (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:41 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/
2012/10/11/3487060/nhl-lockout-2012-nhlpa-posturing (discussing numerous issues that may com-
plicate the 2012 lockout and the future of the NHL).
4. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
5. See Joe LaPointe, Hockey; No Promises, but Federal Mediator Will Try to Settle N.H.L.
Strike, N.Y. TimEs (Apr. 9, 1992), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/09/sports/hockey-
no-promises-but-federal-mediator-will-try-to-settle-nhl-strike.htmI.
6. Id.
53
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mandatory binding arbitration into its collective bargaining process.
The use of mandatory binding arbitration in employment contracts
has grown during recent decades.7 Given the severity and frequency of
disputes between players and owners,8 mandatory binding arbitration
is the only possible solution to resolving the conflicts in the NHL.
The NHL would benefit from a mandatory binding arbitration pro-
vision in a variety of ways. If the NHL Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment called for mandatory binding arbitration, the negotiation process
would become more efficient by establishing a deadline for a new deal
to be reached. This procedure would provide an incentive for the par-
ties to cooperate with one another, so as to not leave decisions on key
issues to a third-party arbitrator. In addition, the potential involve-
ment of an arbitrator would severely mitigate the power that the rep-
resentatives of the players and owners have over the process.
Ultimately, mandatory binding arbitration would ensure that an expir-
ing collective bargaining agreement would not unnecessarily result in
the cancellation of NHL games and prevent the League from losing
billions of dollars in revenue. 9 In addition, the League would no
longer continue to tarnish its relationship with the players, fans, spon-
sors, and local businesses that thrive on the existence of the NHL.
This Comment argues that the NHL must incorporate mandatory
binding arbitration into its collective bargaining process. Part I dis-
cusses the NHL's business structure, the collective bargaining process,
and the League's recent collective bargaining disputes. Part I then
discusses current NHL dispute resolution mechanisms and introduces
non-binding and binding arbitration. Part II argues that the NHL's
current collective bargaining process is ineffective. Part II also ana-
lyzes how mandatory binding arbitration solves collective bargaining
problems. Part III argues that NHL players and owners must accept
mandatory binding arbitration by discussing the dramatic effects fu-
ture lockouts could have on the players, owners, third parties, and the
NHL as a whole. Part IV provides a brief conclusion.
I. BACKGROUND
This Section begins by providing background on the overall busi-
ness structure of the NHL. This Section then introduces the NHL col-
lective bargaining process and discusses the League's recent collective
7. Ashley M. Sergeant, The Corporation's New Lethal Weapon: Mandatory Binding Arbitra-
tion Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REv. 149, 155-57 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court's use and expan-
sion of mandatory binding arbitration clauses in employment contracts).
8. See Baumann, supra note 1.
9. See Baumann, supra note 1; see also Mirtle, supra note 1.
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bargaining disputes. This Section then discusses current dispute reso-
lution procedures in the NHL and concludes by introducing the con-
cept of arbitration.
A. Structure of the NHL
1. The NHL and the Owners
Evaluating labor disputes in the NHL begins with understanding
the business structure of the League. The NHL operates as a non-
profit, unincorporated joint venture. 10 The NHL was established in
191711 and has generated billions of dollars of revenue, which is split
between the players and the team owners.12 All thirty NHL teams
operate as separate business entities.13 Since the creation of the NHL,
the League has developed into an industry that generates billions of
dollars of revenue on an annual basis.1 4
Gary Bettman became the first NHL Commissioner in 1993.15
Bettman's main responsibility is to "act in the best interest of the
League as a whole,"16 and his authorities can be analogized to the
powers of a chief executive officer of any other business.' 7 Bettman
has the power to discipline players and interpret provisions in the
NHL's constitution, rules, and by-laws. 18 Most importantly for this
Comment, Bettman is responsible for acting as an unbiased arbitrator
in resolving disputes between the players and owners in relation to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.19 In addition, if Bettman receives
10. Brian Ward, The National Hockey League's Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Inade-
quacies in Dealing With League Internationalization, 23 SuFroLK TRANSNAT 'L L. REv. 747,
748-49 (2000) (discussing the NHL's business entity, employment relationships, and the collec-
tive bargaining process).
11. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
12. See Mirtle, supra note 1.
13. See Ward, supra note 10.
14. Mathieu Fournier & Dominic Roux, Labor Relations in the National Hockey League: A
Model of Transnational Collective Bargaining?, 20 MARo. SPORTs L. REV. 147, 148 (2009) (dis-
cussing how the players and owners compete for a share of the generated revenue).
15. Thomas J. Arkell, National Hockey League Jurisprudence: Past, Present, and Future, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 135, 136 (1998) (discussing Gary Bettman's experience prior to becom-
ing the commissioner of the NHL).
16. Richard J. Cohen & Joseph M. Hanna, The Rangers' Gloves Are Off in a Digital Tussle
With the NHL, 25 ENT. & SPORTs L. 18, 18 (2008) (summarizing Bettman's authorities and
responsibilities).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Arkell, supra note 15, at 136 (discussing how the players argue Bettman's role as an unbi-
ased arbitrator is not possible, while the NHL argues his role is necessary in order to resolve
disputes and allow the League to efficiently operate). The NHL won the argument in Nat'l
Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Bettman, 1994 WL 738835 (S.D. N.Y 1994). The Plaintiffs were
two NHL hockey players who wanted to void two decisions made by Bettman that concerned
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approval by at least eight of the thirty owners, Bettman has the power
to reject any National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA)
counter-proposal. 20 Further, Bettman helps the owners develop their
collective bargaining strategy.21
2. The NHLPA and the Players
NHL players formed their union in 1957.22 As the popularity of the
game and revenues increased, players saw an opportunity to make
more money.23 In the late 1950s, NHL owners entered into a televi-
sion contract with CBS, which did not allocate any of the profits to the
players.24 Unsurprisingly, the players were unhappy and wanted to
protest the deal. 2 5 Therefore, the players decided to form their union,
known as the NHLPA. 26
The purpose of the NHLPA is to negotiate and enforce fair terms of
employment on behalf of the players.27 Each NHL team elects a Club
Player Representative who serves as a voting member on the NHLPA
Executive Board.28 The board also consists of an Executive Director
who is a non-voting member responsible for managing the NHLPA's
daily affairs.29
In December 2010, Donald Fehr became the Executive Director of
the NHLPA. 30 Fehr assumed the position after more than twenty
years as the Executive Director of the Major League Baseball Players'
contract offers extended to them by the San Jose Sharks. Id. at 1. The Plaintiffs argued the
matter should have been resolved by an independent arbitrator rather than Bettman. Id. How-
ever, the Court found the Collective Bargaining Agreement specifically allowed Bettman to re-
solve such disputes, and there was no reason to believe that Bettman's decisions were biased. Id.
at 11-32.
20. See Christopher Botta, NHL Lockout: Gary Bettman is Going Nowhere - No Matter What,
SPoursBUSINESS JOURNAL SPORTING NEws (Oct. 29, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://aol.sportingnews.
com/nhl/story/2012-10-29/nhl-lockout-news-2012-gary-bettman-criticism-hockey-strike-david-
stern-retire (discussing the challenges Bettman faces in leading the collective interests of all
thirty NHL owners).
21. Id.
22. Jordan 1. Kobritz & Jeffrey F. Levine, Don Fehr Leads the NHLPA: Does the NHL Have
Anything to Fear?, 11 VA. SPORTS & Err. L.J. 178, 178-80 (2011) (discussing the history and
formation of the NHLPA).
23. Jeglic, supra note 1, at 23.
24. Kobritz, supra note 22, at 180.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 180-81.
27. INSIDE NHLPA, available at http://www.nhlpa.comlinside-nhlpa (last visited Nov. 15,
2012).
28. Id.
29. INSIDE NHLPA/ORGANIZATION/EXEC-I-VE BOARD MEMBERS, available at http://www.
nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/organization/executive-board (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
30. Kobritz, supra note 22, at 179.
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Association.31 Fehr first became involved with the NHLPA in 2009 as
an unpaid consultant in order to help the NHLPA amend its constitu-
tion.32 Fehr is a highly regarded figure in sports law33 and offers much
needed stability to the NHLPA, which had gone through four differ-
ent executive directors in the five years before Fehr assumed the
position.34
B. Collective Bargaining Agreement Process
The NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement is a written instrument
that controls the relationships between NHL players, owners, and
teams.35 Specifically, the Collective Bargaining Agreement contains
provisions governing rules, arbitration and grievance procedures,
along with minimum player salaries and working conditions. 36 The
NHL's role in the collective bargaining process is to represent the col-
lective interests of all thirty NHL franchises and owners.37
Once an NHL collective bargaining agreement expires, the negotia-
tion of a new collective bargaining agreement typically starts with the
owners meeting with the NHLPA representatives. 38 The process be-
gins with the union representative presenting the employer with a list
of issues and proposals that must be discussed. 39 Such issues in the
NHL have previously concerned revenue division between players
and owners, the structure of player contracts, and player salary lim-
its.40 The NHL may then accept the union's proposals, offer counter-
proposals, or simply do nothing.41 Both sides will continue to meet
and exchange proposals in order to come to an agreement. 42 The law
31. Id.
32. See Jeff Z. Klein, The N.H.L. Players Union Votes to Appoint Fehr as Its Leader, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/sports/hockey/19fehr.html (discussing
how the players have given Fehr credit for uniting the players and bringing much-needed order
to the NHLPA).
33. Kobritz, supra note 22, at 206-08 (discussing Donald Fehr's past involvement with the
Major League Baseball Players' Association [MLBPA] and how Fehr came to be the executive
director of the NHLPA).
34. Id. at 179.
35. See CoiLECnIViE BARGAINING AGREEMENT Br-IWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LFAGUE AND
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' AssocIATIoN, available at http://cdn.agilitycms.com/
nhlpacom/PDF/NHL NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf.
36. Id.
37. See Mirtle, supra note 1.
38. See Section 5: Collective Bargaining, in Labour: Markets, Laws, and Unions, CANADIAN
FOUNDATION FOR ECONoMic EDUCATION, available at http://www.cfee.org/en/pdf/labourstudent
5.pdf.
39. Id.
40. See Baumann, supra note 1; see also Mirtle, supra note 1.
41. See Section 5: Collective Bargaining, in Labour: Markets, Laws, and Unions, supra note 38.
42. Id.
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is aimed at being as deferential as possible to the two sides, and only
requires that the parties negotiate in good faith. 43
C. Recent Collective Bargaining Disputes in the NHL
As the NHL's hockey-related revenue has steadily increased over
the past couple of decades, 44 conflicts between the NHL and the
NHLPA have dramatically increased as well. 4 5 Since Gary Bettman
became the commissioner of the NHL in 1993, the League has exper-
ienced three significant labor disputes, all of which have led to the
cancellation of games. 46
1. 1994-1995 Lockout
In 1994 the NHL experienced what was, at the time, considered to
be a lengthy lockout. The 1993-1994 season was played without a col-
lective bargaining agreement, and Gary Bettman insisted that the
1994-1995 season would not begin without a new collective bargaining
agreement.4 7 On the day the 1994-1995 season was set to begin, the
owners locked out the players.4 8 The primary issue was the owners'
insistence on implementing salary caps that would limit how much
teams were allowed to pay their players. 4 9 Owners felt the salary cap
system would help equalize costs throughout the league, but the play-
ers preferred the implementation of a revenue sharing scheme.50
The NHL did not use a mediator to help with negotiations, and the
lockout lasted 104 days.5 ' Only forty-eight games, as opposed to the
typically schedule of eighty-two games, were played that season. 52 In
addition, the Collective Bargaining Agreement that was put in place
after months of negotiations between the players and owners failed to
adequately resolve the salary cap issue, which led to the infamous
lockout during the 2004-2005 season.53
43. Id.
44. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Baumann, supra note 1, at 281.
48. Id.
49. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
50. Id.
51. Baumann, supra note 1, at 282.
52. Daniel Gregory Horowitz, The Effect of Strikes and Lockouts on the Strength of Profes-
sional Sports Leagues (2011) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, The Ohio State University),
available at http://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/48847/TheEffect-ofStrikes and
Lockouts on theStrength-ofProfessionalSportsLeagues.pdf?sequence=1.
53. Baumann, supra note 1, at 282.
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2. 2004-2005 Lockout
The 2004-2005 labor dispute resulted in the cancellation of the en-
tire NHL season. 5 4 In 2003, with eleven and one-half months remain-
ing on the then-current Collective Bargaining Agreement, the NHL
and NHLPA attempted to negotiate a new agreement.55 The owners
insisted on implementing a thirty-one million dollar team salary cap
into the Collective Bargaining Agreement in order to control player
salaries.56 In October of 2003, the players offered a slight reduction in
their salaries, but the owners sought larger reductions. 57 With no pro-
cess of arbitration included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement 58
the parties had no incentive to negotiate with one another in good
faith.59
The players and owners continued to resist one another, and on
September 15, 2004, the owners locked out the players.60 Five months
later, despite ongoing negotiations and the use of federal mediators,
the NHL cancelled the entire 2004-2005 season. 61 This was the first
time a labor dispute forced a North American sport to cancel an en-
tire season.6 2 The players and owners did not agree to a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement until July 2005.63
The adjustments to the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement ap-
pear to have had a positive financial effect on the League. In the
three previous years before the lockout, the NHL had an overall nega-
tive operating income each season, and more than half of the NHL
franchises had a negative operating income. 64 However, due to salary
cap adjustments, rule changes, and the introduction of revenue shar-
ing after the lockout, only eight teams had a negative operating in-
come and the NHL as a whole had a positive operating income of
$125,100,000.65 Despite the positive financial gains the NHL exper-
54. See Horowitz, supra note 52.
55. Blake Murphy, A Look Back at the NHL Lockout, available at http://blakemurphy.com/
2008/04/12/a-look-back-at-the-nhl-lockout/.
56. Baumann, supra note 1, at 283.
57. Id.
58. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE ANI)
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PL AYERS' AssocIATIoN, supra note 35.
59. See Murphy, supra note 55.
60. Baumann, supra note 1, at 283.
61. Id.
62. Stephen M. Yoost, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time For a Line
Change, 21 01110 ST. J. ON DisP. REsoi. 485, 485 (2006) (discussing changes that were made to
the 2004-2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement as a result of the lockout, as well as arguing for
the implementation of future changes in order to prevent future lockouts).
63. Baumann, supra note 1, at 284.
64. Id.
65. Id.
59
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ienced after the implementation of the 2005 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the League lost an estimated $2 billion in revenue and the
players lost roughly $1 billion in salaries as a result of the entire sea-
son being cancelled. 66
3. 2012-2013 Lockout
Just eight years later, the NHL endured another lockout during the
2012-2013 season.67 One main issue surrounding the 2012-2013 lock-
out was determining how the players and owners would share hockey-
related revenue. 68 The previous Collective Bargaining Agreement
gave the players fifty-seven percent of hockey-related revenues, while
the owners received the remaining forty-three percent.69 The League
had experienced annual revenue growth of 7.1 percent after the
2004-2005 lockout, and the owners insisted on receiving a higher per-
centage of that revenue.70 Mediator Scot Beckenbaugh became in-
volved in the process in December of 2012.71 Beckenbaugh received
praise in his role of bringing the parties together 72 and in January
2013, the NHL and the NHLPA reached a new collective bargaining
agreement.73
Shortly after the parties reached an agreement, the NHL an-
nounced that a forty-eight game season would be played.74 Each team
held a brief one-week training camp before beginning a season in
which each team played an average of three and one-half games per
week.75 As a result of the lockout, a total of 625 games were can-
66. Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of2004-05, MONTHLY LAnOR REVIEW, BUREAU
OF LA1OR SrATISTIcs (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.bis.gov/opub/mlr/2005/12/art3full.pdf.
67. Katie Strang, NHL, NHLPA Make No Progress, ESPN (Oct. 2, 2012, 7:55 PM), http://
espn.go.com/nhllstoryl/id/8452874/latest-meeting-not-overly-encouraging (citing the "lack of
common ground" as the reason the two parties had not yet been able to negotiate a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement).
68. See Mirtle, supra note 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pat Leonard, Mediation With Scott Beckenbaugh Gets NHL, Union on Track, DAILY
NEWS (Jan. 6, 2013), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/rangers/2013/01/mediation-
with-scot-beckenbaugh-gets-nhl-union-on-track-bill-daly-says-parties-are-t.
72. Id. (quoting Bill Daly: "[t]he mediator has obviously done a great job. Slow process, but
at least the parties are talking and working through issues.").
73. Ira Podell & Ronald Blum, NHL Lockout: Players' Union, League Reach Deal to Restart
Hockey Season, HUFFINGTON Posr (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/06/
nhl-lockout-deal-reached n 2419552.html.
74. Bloomberg, NHL 48-Game Season Starts Jan. 19 After Players Accept Contract, TOLEDO
BLADE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/sports/2013/01/13/NHL-48-game-season-
starts-Jan-19-after-players-accept-contract.html.
75. Id.
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celled.76 The lost games cost the League an estimated one billion dol-
lars in revenues.77
D. Current NHL Dispute Resolution Procedures
The NHL currently does not use a formal dispute resolution process
in order to resolve collective bargaining disputes. However, the NHL
does have different dispute resolution mechanisms in order to resolve
other conflicts. Salary arbitration and mediation services are two
prime examples.
1. Salary Arbitration
While the current NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement does not
call for mandatory binding arbitration, it does use an arbitration pro-
cess as a means of resolving player salary disputes.78 Under the terms
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, salary arbitration is used to
resolve disputes between players who are considered to be restricted
free agents and the NHL franchise the respective player plays for. 79
Restricted free agents differ from unrestricted free agents in that
when their contract ends, their respective team has the right to match
any other contract offer the player receives from another team.80 This
allows the team to retain the player and the team is committed to
honor the contract originally offered by the other team.81 There are
various goals restricted free agents attempt to accomplish through sal-
ary arbitration, the most common being an increase in salary.8 2 Once
salary arbitration is initiated, a salary arbitrator resolves the dispute.83
2. Mediation Services
As briefly mentioned above, previous NHL lockouts have included
mediation services. 84 Professional sports currently fall under the juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).85 For example,
76. Id.
77. See Podell, supra note 73.
78. John B. Sprenzel, Salary Arbitration in the National Hockey League: Taking the Next Step
With Online Dispute Resolution, 62 Disp. Rrsoi. J. 64, 67 (2007) (discussing the NHL's salary
arbitration procedure).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Baumann, supra note 1, at 280.
85. Id. at 296.
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during a player strike that occurred during the 1992 NHL season,86
federal mediator John Martin was assigned to help the parties come to
an agreement.87
In order for either one of these services to become involved, one of
the two parties must either file a claim alleging bad faith on the part of
the other side, or request a mediator's involvement.88 Typically,
claims involving bad faith are deemed to be moot or are dropped
before a ruling is made.89 As a result, any third party involvement
usually derives from one party requesting the use of a mediator.90
While the mediation service can attempt to facilitate the negotiation
process between the parties, the service has no authority to implement
binding arbitration.9'
Since the NHL is willing to use dispute resolution processes in cer-
tain disputes, it is not unrealistic to suggest the League would consider
implementing a formal dispute resolution mechanism into the
League's collective bargaining process. While the NHL's current dis-
pute resolution procedures call for the involvement of third parties in
order to help settle certain disputes, the League must take the next
step in order to permanently resolve ongoing collective bargaining
conflicts, which have severe impacts not only on the NHL, but busi-
nesses and employees that rely on the existence of the league. Imple-
menting an arbitration process is the only adequate solution.
E. Arbitration
Arbitration is "a method of dispute resolution in which the parties
submit a dispute to an impartial [person or] persons who have been
selected by the parties for a final and binding decision." 92 Generally,
arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism used to
avoid taking a dispute to court.93 There are two types of arbitration:
non-binding and binding arbitration.
86. Id. at 280 (discussing how before the 1991 season, the CBA expired without a new CBA to
take its place). The players and owners decided to begin the season and attempt to negotiate a
new CBA while the season was underway. Id. In April, the two sides still had not come to an
agreement, and the players went on strike. Id. After the NHLPA rejected what the owners
declared was a "final offer," a mediator became involved in the process. Id. Ten days after the
mediator became involved, the strike ended and the rest of the season was preserved. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Baumann, supra note 1, at 280.
91. Id.
92. Sergeant, supra note 7, at 149.
93. Id. at 151.
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1. Non-binding Arbitration
One form of arbitration is known as non-binding arbitration. 94
Non-binding arbitration differs from binding arbitration only in that
the parties may choose to bypass the arbitrator's decision,95 rather
than being automatically bound.96 Although the parties are not
forced to abide by the award of the arbitrator, those in favor of non-
binding arbitration view it as a way to facilitate the negotiation pro-
cess.97 An arbitrator's decision may indicate how a judge might re-
solve the dispute, and that information could help the parties reach a
settlement in the future.98 The major downside is if the parties are
unable to settle after receiving the arbitrator's award, the non-binding
arbitration procedure could have little, if any, effect.99
2. Binding Arbitration
Binding arbitration is "a method of dispute resolution involving one
or more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disput-
ing parties and whose decision is binding."100 Those in favor of
mandatory binding arbitration clauses feel the provision allows proce-
dural flexibility by allowing the parties to control how quickly the pro-
cess is handled. 01 In addition, the arbitrator could potentially have a
more specific background regarding the issues in dispute than a judge
would. 102 Arbitration also offers the parties the option of keeping the
process private, as opposed to a public trial, in which the public has
the ability to follow and monitor the proceedings.10 3 The process of
arbitration may also shield the parties' views from the public, allowing
the parties to take positions that they would otherwise be adverse
from taking, thus potentially facilitating the negotiating process. 104
94. Stephen C. Bennett, Non-Binding Arbitration: An Introduction, 61 Diste. Rusoi. J. 22,
24-25 (2006) (discussing the positives and negatives to non-binding arbitration as well as the
effects an award may have on the parties).
95. Charles B. Carter, Non-Binding Arbitration: Curse or Blessing?, 28 No. 3 TRIAL Aovoc.
Q. 23, 24 (2009) (discussing how a non-binding arbitration award entered at the conclusion of a
hearing "shall be final" unless a party requests a trial within a given time frame).
96. Bennett, supra note 94, at 24.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Yoost, supra note 62, at 498.
101. Sergeant, supra note 7, at 155-57.
102. Id.
103. Joshua M. Wickard, Mandatory Arbitration in Real Estate and Related Transactions, 45
ADVOC. 18, 18 (2002).
104. Courtney Lofti, Doping, Athletes, and Arbitration, 2006 DEN. U. SPORrIs & Eur. L.J. 1,
10 (2006).
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Those opposed to mandatory binding arbitration clauses feel that
they deprive the parties of their ability to have the dispute heard in
court. 0 5 While proponents argue that binding arbitration is less ex-
pensive than litigation, many opponents feel that the process is poten-
tially more expensive because of the fees that must be paid in order to
begin the arbitration procedure and travel expenses the parties will
inevitably incur. 06
The NHL's continuous lockouts show the League's collective bar-
gaining process is unworkable. Since Gary Bettman became commis-
sioner, the League has endured three collective bargaining disputes
that have severely impacted the operation of the NHL. 07 The
League's use of dispute resolution mechanisms in other contexts sug-
gests the League may be willing to accept a change that would prevent
future lockouts from continuing to occur. Implementing mandatory
binding arbitration into the collective bargaining process is the
answer.
II. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by the NHL's numerous lockouts, the League's cur-
rent collective bargaining process must be amended. This Section ar-
gues that the collective bargaining process does not work because
Gary Bettman and Donald Fehr are unable to effectively work to-
gether in order to represent the players' and owners' collective inter-
ests. This Section proceeds by arguing that the players and owners
must implement mandatory binding arbitration in order to regain con-
trol of the League by mitigating the roles of Bettman and Fehr. This
Section then explains how implementing mandatory binding arbitra-
tion would mitigate the roles of Bettman and Fehr, and prevent future
lockouts. This Section then concludes by offering a proposal for how
the mandatory binding arbitration process could work procedurally.
A. Inability of Bettman and Fehr to Effectively Negotiate
The NHL and NHLPA, as evidenced by all three of the recent lock-
outs, are unable to cooperate with one another and efficiently resolve
collective bargaining disputes. While Bettman has been the NHL's
representative for all three of the lockouts, the recent addition of Fehr
as the director of the NHLPA has only further complicated the pro-
cess. The parties' continuous inability to work with one another is
105. Sergeant, supra note 7, at 164.
106. Id. at 165.
107. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
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best evidenced by the 2012-2013 lockout. Any momentum gained in
the initial stages of the 2012-2013 lockout's collective bargaining pro-
cess was impeded by insignificant counter-proposals 08 and inexcus-
able delays in negotiation sessions. 09
After the owners' submitted a proposal to the NHLPA on October
16, 2012, the two parties had a face-to-face meeting where the
NHLPA presented three-counter proposals, which the owners deemed
to be far from acceptable. 110 After the meeting, Gary Bettman stated
it's "clear we're not speaking the same language . . . we're nowhere
close to what we proposed ... I don't know what the next step is ... I
am to say the least thoroughly disappointed.""' In November 2012,
after spending nearly a week in New York City negotiating, NHL
Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly stated that the parties made "no pro-
gress."1 2 In addition, Donald Fehr stated, "I don't see a path to an
agreement here."'13
The inability of Bettman and Fehr to work with one another is obvi-
ous and extremely problematic. Unless the collective bargaining pro-
cess is amended in a way that would force the parties to take a softer
stance on their demands and negotiate in good faith, they will con-
tinue to be at odds in future negotiations for two reasons: 1) the play-
ers refuse to work with Gary Bettman and 2) the owners are
frustrated with Donald Fehr's involvement as the Executive Director
of the NHLPA.
1. Gary Bettman
The players' hostility toward Bettman is largely a result of
Bettman's history of locking out the players. The players' feelings to-
wards Bettman were recently articulated by NHL player Henrik Zet-
108. Bruce McCurdy, Double Whammy: Parties "Not Speaking the Same Language", Be it
NHL CBA Talks or Downtown Arena Negotiations, EDMONTON JOURNAL (Oct. 18, 2012), avail-
able at http://blogs.edmontonjournal.com/2012/10/18/impasse-the-watchword-at-league-and-lo-
cal-levels/.
109. Ira Podell, NHL lockout 2012: League, Union Still Talking But Not Negotiating, WASH.
POST (Oct. 22, 2012), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/22/nhl-lock-
out-2012-league-union-still-talking-not-ne/.
110. See John Vogl, Union Counteroffers Go Nowhere Fast, BUFFALO NEWS (Oct. 18, 2012),
available at http://www.buffalonews.comlapps/pbcs.dii/article?AID=/20121018/SPORTS/121019
110/1004.
111. Id.
112. James O'Brien, Daly Admits "No Progress" Was Made on Sunday, NBC SPORTS:
PROHOCKEYTALK (Nov. 11, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2012/11/11/
daly-admits-no-progress-was-made-on-sunday/.
113. Joe Yerdon, Fehr on Contracting Issues: "I Don't See a Path to an Agreement Here", NBC
SPORTS: PROHOCKEYTALK (Nov. 11, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2012/
11/1 1/fehr-on-contract-issues-i-dont-see-a-path-to-an-agreement-here/.
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terberg who stated that "[i]t's the third lockout in I don't know how
many years now. Ever since Bettman came into the League offices,
that's been his way to handle stuff . . . we're ready to have a fight
here."' 14 In addition, NHL veteran Jason Chimera stated "I don't
trust Gary Bettman right now."115
One NHL columnist suggests that the players may be more recep-
tive to the negotiation process if Bettman was no longer involved."16
In September, when the scheduling of an eighty-two game season was
still possible, the columnist said the chance of there being an NHL
season in 2012-2013 was merely fifteen percent" and added that "the
players in the NHL are sick and tired of Gary Bettman, and they will
sacrifice their greater financial good to drive this man out of the
game."ns1 Allan Walsh, who is the agent of many NHL players, stated
"Bettman has become such a toxic commodity for the game, it's un-
tenable after three lockouts that he be the person to grow revenues in
partnership with the players going forward."119 NHL superstar Alex-
ander Ovechkin is so upset with Gary Bettman that he has threatened
to finish his professional hockey career in Russia.120 A frustrated
Ovechkin added, "Bettman decided to throw dust in our eyes because
[the] media isn't talking about him very well lately." 121
Despite Bettman's lack of popularity with the players, driving
Bettman out of the game is not a viable solution. The owners are
happy with Bettman, and continue to give him five-year contract ex-
114. Helene St. James, Red Wings' Henrik Zetterberg: Players Ready for a 'Fight' With Gary
Bettman, NHL, DETROfr FREE PRESs (Sep. 14, 2012), available at http://www.freep.com/article/
20 120914/SPORTS05/120914058/detroit-red-wings-henrik-zetterberg-lockout; see also Jason
Brough, Players Haven't Been Instructed to "Demonize" Bettman, Says NHLPA, NBC Si'owrs:
PRoHOCKEYTALK (Nov. 14, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2012/11/14/
players-havent-been-instructed-to-demonize-bettman-says-nhlpal (quoting other NHL players'
statements regarding their feelings towards Bettman).
115. Katie Carrera, Jason Chimera: 'I Don't Trust Gary Bettman Right Now' WASH. PosT
(Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capitals-insider/wp/2013/01/03/
jason-chimera-i-dont-trust-gary-bettman-right-now/.
116. Adrian Dater, Why I Don't Think There Will Be an NHL Season, DENVER Pos-r (Sep. 29,
2012), available at http://blogs.denverpost.com/avs/2012/09/29/nhl-season/11655/.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Christopher Botta, In His Third Lockout, Bettman Maneuvers With Owners' Backing,
SPORTSBUSINESS JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2012/10/29/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/Bettman.aspx.
120. SportsNet Staff, Ovechkin Blasts NHL, Threatens to Stay in KHL, SPORTrsNiE r (Oct. 20,
2012, 9:21 PM), http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl-lockout/2012/10/20/alexovechkin-nhl lock-
out khl/.
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tensions. 122 Gary Bettman is not going anywhere anytime soon, and
any attempt by the players to force Bettman out of the League will be
unsuccessful. Therefore, the only solution is amending the collective
bargaining process in a way that would diminish Bettman's power.
2. Donald Fehr
While the players are unwilling to work with Bettman, the recent
appointment of Donald Fehr as the Executive Director of the NHLPA
poses the risk of the owners developing similar hostility towards the
NHLPA. While previous negotiations have been "owner-friendly,"
Donald Fehr is unlikely to make the negotiating mistakes that previ-
ous NHLPA Executive Directors were accustomed to making. 1 2 3 The
negotiation process of the 2012-2013 lockout provided evidence that
Fehr's presence has caused more complication than in years past.12 4
In November 2012, after spending four days in extensive negotiations
in New York City, the NHL and the NHLPA remained far apart on
reaching a new Collective Bargaining Agreement.125 At the conclu-
sion of the meetings in New York City, the NHL blamed Fehr for
misrepresenting the league's proposals to the players. 126 Fehr insisted
that the NHL's accusations were inaccurate, and the players contin-
ued to support Fehr.1 2 7 After the four days of negotiations concluded,
Bettman stated he would be willing to stay in New York to continue
negotiations, but Bettman's frustrations with Fehr and the NHLPA
led him to question whether doing so would have any effect.' 28
While the NHL suggested Fehr is the problem, Fehr was just as
quick to blame the owners.12 9 While talking to media about the lock-
out, Fehr stated that "[t]his is a lockout they decided to have, this was
a lockout of choice. There was no reason for it. Negotiations could
still be ongoing . .. if there's a problem here, maybe someone ought to
look in the mirror over there."130 In addition, when faced with pro-
posals from the owners, Fehr frequently asked "what's in it for the
122. Id.; see also Pierre LeBrun, Gary Betman Locked in for Long Term, ESPN (Mar. 11,
2011, 2:01 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhilnews/story?id=6206543.
123. Kobritz, supra note 22, at 215.
124. Pat Leonard, Talks Turn Ugly as NHL Fumes at Fehr, DAILY NEWS (Nov. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/hockey/talks-turn-ugly-nhi-fumes-fehr-atiCle-1.
1199867?localLinksEnabled=false.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Leonard, supra note 124.
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players?"' 3' The collective bargaining process needs a change that
would mitigate the roles of Fehr and Bettman, while also encouraging
the parties to work with one another, rather than blame the other
side.
3. Unwillingness to Embrace the Presence of a Mediator
In addition to their inability to work together, Fehr and Bettman
have shown they are unwilling to allow a mediator to get involved at
the early stages of a lockout. The use of a federal mediator in order to
facilitate negotiations during the initial stages of the 2012-2013 lock-
out was considered.132 Donald Fehr reportedly discussed the possibil-
ity with NHL commissioner Gary Bettman.133 However, Bill Daly
pointed out that "[a] mediator can only be helpful if both sides are
willing to embrace it and compromise."13 4 Daly added that he "didn't
think that the introduction of a mediator into the process was timely
or that it would necessarily further the process."' 35 Donald Fehr ad-
ded that the NHLPA would be "averse" to the presence of a mediator
in the negotiating process.136
Experienced mediator Arthur Boyland was willing to become in-
volved in the process in November 2012,137 but Fehr and Bettman re-
sisted the presence of any mediator until January 2013.138 Arthur
Boyland is a U.S. Magistrate Judge who ultimately helped resolve the
2011 National Football League collective bargaining dispute.139 Boy-
land was eager to get involved and stated, "I'd volunteer to do it for
free . . . I'd love to get this thing done."1 40 The fact that the parties
were able to reach an agreement relatively quickly after a mediator
got involved in January suggests that a mediator may have been able
131. Jason Brough, Columnist: Players Fighting Bettman More Than Anything, NBC Sp'oRTS:
PROHOCKEYTALK, (Oct. 1, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://m.nbcsports.com/content/columnist-players-
fighting-bettman-more-anything.
132. See Strang, supra note 67.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Ryan Dadoun, Will the NHL, Union Seek a Federal Mediator Soon?, NBC SPORTS:
PRoHOCKEYTALK (Nov. 13, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2012/11/13/
will-the-nhl-un ion-seek-a-federal-mediator-soon/.
136. See Strang, supra note 67.
137. Mike Halford, Former NFL Labor Mediator on NHL Lockout: "I'd Volunteer To Do It
For Free", NBC SPoizTs: PRoHOCKEYTALK (Nov. 15, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://prohockeytalk.
nbcsports.com/2012/11/15/former-nfl-labor-mediator-on-nhl-lockout-id-volunteer-to-do-it-for-
free/ (discussing how Boyland "helped bridge the gap" between the parties in the NFL collective
bargaining process).
138. See Leonard, supra note 71.
139. See Halford, supra note 137.
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to help reach an agreement as early as November. Instead, Fehr and
Bettman chose to continue to fight it out between themselves, rather
than embracing the help that mediators can provide. As a result, an
agreement was not reached until January, after 625 games had been
lost.141
It is obvious that the collective bargaining process must be
amended. Why should the players and owners allow Bettman and
Fehr to continue to be uncooperative with each another? The role of
both Fehr and Bettman is to represent the interests of the players and
owners. However, the tension caused by the presence of the two has
drastically impacted the well being of both parties. If the players and
owners implemented mandatory binding arbitration, the roles of
Bettman and Fehr would be mitigated because a third party would
have the authority to resolve the dispute if the two are unable to do so
themselves. Rather than Bettman and Fehr continuing to offer insig-
nificant and unrealistic counter-proposals that lead to lockouts and
lost revenues, the two parties would be encouraged to work with one
another and lockouts would forever be prevented.
B. Why Binding Arbitration Must Be Implemented
The players and owners must find a way to regain control over the
NHL's collective bargaining process; mandatory binding arbitration is
the answer. A collective bargaining process that requires mandatory
binding arbitration would provide an incentive for Bettman and Fehr
to engage in a good-faith negotiation process, rather than continuing
to point fingers at one another. This Section discusses why binding
arbitration, rather than non-binding arbitration, is needed. The Sec-
tion then discusses how mandatory binding arbitration cures collective
bargaining issues. Finally, a proposal for how mandatory binding arbi-
tration could be implemented is offered.
1. Why Binding Arbitration, Rather than Non-Binding Arbitration,
Is Needed
The implementation of non-binding arbitration would not have the
effect that binding arbitration would. The problem with the NHL's
collective bargaining process is that Bettman and Fehr are not willing
to participate in the kind of give-and-take negotiation process that is
necessary to quickly resolve a dispute. A non-binding arbitration pro-
vision would fail to resolve this issue.
141. See Bloomberg, supra note 74.
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One positive of a non-binding arbitration award in other contexts is
that it can help the parties forecast what a judge might conclude in
resolving their dispute, thus allowing the parties to take that predic-
tion into consideration during the negotiation process.142 However,
since the players and owners are not forced to litigate their dispute in
front of a judge, a non-binding arbitration provision would serve no
practical purpose in the NHL collective bargaining process. Rather
than using the non-binding arbitration award as a negotiating tool, the
parties will simply ignore it because the chance of a third party ever
resolving their dispute is not guaranteed.
Further, should a non-binding arbitration provision be taken into
effect, not only will the parties not use it as a negotiating tool, but
there is no reasonable indication that the parties would agree to be
bound by the award. Whichever side is unhappy with the arbitrator's
decision could simply refuse to abide by it. Because the parties would
have no incentive to cooperate in good faith, the non-binding arbitra-
tion process would prove to be ineffective. A non-binding arbitration
proceeding would be no different than the parties volunteering to use
a mediator which, as discussed above, the parties already have the
ability to do. The NHL needs to take the next step and implement
mandatory binding arbitration.
2. How Mandatory Binding Arbitration Fixes the NHL's Collective
Bargaining Problems
A mandatory binding arbitration provision would mitigate the roles
of Bettman and Fehr, while also providing them with an incentive to
work with one another, thus making the collective bargaining process
more efficient. As articulated above, the current collective bargaining
process is not subject to arbitration, and as a result, Bettman and Fehr
have no incentive to negotiate in good faith. 14 3 Implementing
mandatory binding arbitration is how the players and owners can miti-
gate the roles of Bettman and Fehr and take back control of the col-
lective bargaining process. Bettman and Fehr would no longer be able
to exchange insignificant counter-proposals and blame the other
party. Rather, they would have to work with one another in good
faith in order to avoid an arbitrator resolving the dispute on his or her
own. This process allows Bettman and Fehr to still serve as the repre-
sentative of the players and owners, but would reduce the authority
they have and ensure a much more efficient collective bargaining pro-
142. See Bennett, supra note 94.
143. See Murphy, supra note 55.
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cess. Ultimately, lockouts would be prevented and the NHL's exis-
tence and potential for growth would no longer be threatened by the
inability of two lone individuals to work with one another.
3. Obstacles to the Implementation of Mandatory Binding
Arbitration
While using mandatory binding arbitration in the NHL collective
bargaining process is possible, many details would need to be worked
out before the parties would agree to include the process. One major
obstacle in implementing mandatory binding arbitration is that the
parties must negotiate and determine exactly how the arbitration pro-
cess would work. Naturally, each side will want to draft the provision
in a way that would be favorable to them.144 Because a mandatory
binding arbitration provision ultimately leaves the dispute up to the
arbitrator, the main issues the parties will need to determine ahead of
time will be who pays for the costs of the arbitrator and who the arbi-
trator will be.
How the parties would decide to pay for the presence of an arbitra-
tor is difficult to forecast. The presence of an arbitrator would not be
overly expensive, and a 50-50 split would certainly be reasonable. The
process of selecting an arbitrator is a little easier to suggest, given the
precedent established by Major League Baseball (MLB). In MLB, a
panel of arbitrators can be agreed to and selected by both parties.14 5
If the two parties are unable to jointly agree to a panel by a certain
date, the American Arbitration Association provides one for them.14 6
Given the current conflict and unwillingness to cooperate with one
another, it is unrealistic to suggest that Bettman and Fehr can agree
on anything, much less a panel of arbitrators which will determine the
outcome of their disputes. Finding an outside party to provide an ar-
bitration panel, such as the American Arbitration Association, is more
realistic. Further, it would be most beneficial to the parties, in order
to eliminate costs and expenses, for only one arbitrator to be selected
from the panel that is provided for them. Allowing one person to
have the authority to resolve the collective bargaining issues, rather
than a panel that determines the outcome together, would also pro-
vide a further incentive for the parties to make sure they reach an
144. See Baumann, supra note 1.
145. David J. Faurot & Stephen McAllister, Salary Arbitrations and Pre-Arbitration Negotia-
tion in Major League Baseball, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Riev. 697, 699-700 (1992) (discussing the
"final offer" arbitration process, as well as arbitrator authority, and how arbitrators are
selected).
146. Id.
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agreement on their own before the fate of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement comes down to the decision of merely one arbitrator.
After agreeing on how the arbitrator is paid and selected, the par-
ties then must draft a mandatory binding arbitration provision that
would provide the technical details of how the procedure would work.
One way of implementing mandatory binding arbitration would be
similar to MLB's "final offer" arbitration system, which is used to set-
tle player salary disputes. 147 In MLB "final offer" arbitration, each
side submits an offer to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator conducts a
hearing where the parties explain their positions, and are allowed to
rebut the other party's position.148 Typically the parties are able to
reach a settlement before the arbitrator renders his or her award, but
if no settlement is reached, the arbitrator delivers a final decision,
choosing one of the two proposals for the player's salary. 149 MLB's
final offer salary arbitration system has had the effect of facilitating
negotiations between players and their respective teams.150 It is
therefore likely that a mandatory binding arbitration provision in the
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement would have the same results.
It is also conceivable that the presence of a mandatory binding arbi-
tration provision in the collective bargaining process would provide
enough incentive for the parties to reach an agreement on their own,
before an arbitrator ever becomes involved. Since an arbitrator ren-
ders a final decision in the event that the parties cannot resolve the
dispute,15' the parties will not only negotiate in good faith, but they
will try as hard as possible to reach a deal on their own. MLB's use of
"final offer" arbitration has had this exact effect.152 Thus, in addition
to potentially resolving the disputes between the players and owners,
the mandatory binding provision is likely to motivate Bettman and
Fehr to reach an agreement before a mandatory binding arbitration
process even begins. Either way, future NHL lockouts would be en-
tirely avoided.
4. Procedural Proposal
There are numerous possibilities regarding how the mandatory
binding arbitration process would work procedurally. One possibility
147. Id. at 697.
148. Id. at 698-99.
149. Id. at 697.
150. Id. at 701.
151. See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, The Labor Arbitrator's Several Roles, 44 MD.
L. REV. 873, 874-76 (1985) (discussing how the arbitrator may act as a mediator, agreement
maker, contract reader, and judge).
152. See Faurot, supra note 145.
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is to insert a provision directly into the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment that subjects the parties to arbitration in the event that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement expires without a new agreement ready to
take its place.
The procedural details are flexible, and would be negotiated by the
players and owners ahead of time. One possibility is, in the event that
the parties do not reach an agreement, a hearing in front of an arbitra-
tor would be set five days after the expiration of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement. The hearing would be conducted much like an
ordinary negotiating meeting, and its primary purpose would be to
allow the arbitrator to gain familiarity with the parties and the dis-
puted issues. The hearing also would provide the parties with another
opportunity to hear one another's positions and possibly allow the
parties to reach an agreement before arbitration takes place.
An arbitration date would then be set five days after the hearing.
This period would allow the parties to strategically come up with their
proposals on all disputed issues and provide a final opportunity for the
parties to reach an agreement on their own. Each side would submit
its proposal to the arbitrator at least forty-eight hours before the
scheduled arbitration date. During arbitration, each party would have
sixty minutes to orally present their proposals to the arbitrator, and
then each side would have an additional thirty minutes to rebut any
arguments made by the other side.
The arbitrator would be given an additional forty-eight hours to de-
termine which one of the two proposals he or she finds most appropri-
ate, rather than attempt to establish a middle-ground, just like MLB's
"final offer" salary arbitration procedure. 153 The arbitrator would
then award a judgment declaring which one of the proposals is to be
taken into effect. The parties are then forced to sign and abide by the
agreement.
Using the NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement that expired on
September 15, 2012 as an example, the course of events can be out-
lined as follows. Since the agreement expired without a new one
ready to take its place, the parties would have been forced to attend a
negotiation session, with the presence of an arbitrator, on September
20. If the parties failed to reach an agreement by September 25, an
arbitration meeting would have been held. The arbitrator's award,
which would be the Collective Bargaining Agreement, would have
taken effect on September 27, 2012. Because a new collective bar-
gaining agreement would have been guaranteed by the time NHL reg-
153. Id.
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ular season games begin in early October, the start of the season
would have never been in jeopardy. As a result, no games would have
been cancelled.
Mandatory binding arbitration would solve the NHL collective bar-
gaining process's inefficiencies. Bettman and Fehr would be forced to
work together and resolve the dispute, or else an arbitrator would
simply do it for them. No longer would Bettman and Fehr have the
ability to delay negotiations and allow work stoppages to continue to
occur. Why should the players and owners continue to allow Bettman
and Fehr to fight over small issues at the cost of billions of dollars? If
the NHL players and owners agreed to include mandatory binding
arbitration into the collective bargaining process, Bettman and Fehr
would more adequately represent their interests by preventing both
the players and owners from continuing to lose money as a result of
cancelled games.
III. IMPACT
The NHL must implement mandatory binding arbitration into its
collective bargaining process. The three lockouts that the NHL has
experienced during Gary Bettman's tenure as Commissioner of the
NHL have had severe impacts on the players, owners, and the League
as a whole. Lockouts simply cannot continue and mandatory binding
arbitration is the answer. This Section argues that the League must
implement mandatory binding arbitration by explaining how the NHL
as a whole, as well as the livelihoods of players and third parties, is
severely at risk if the NHL fails to implement mandatory binding
arbitration.
A. Impact of Lockouts on the Operation of the
National Hockey League
Sacrificing billions of dollars in revenue from the cancellation of
games due to ongoing collective bargaining disputes is not a pattern
the League can afford to continue. Due to the increase in revenue,
the players and owners are even more at risk than they were during
the 2004-2005 lockout. 154 NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly esti-
mated that as a result of cancelling the 2012-2013 preseason alone, the
NHL incurred "$100 million in damages to the business that's not go-
ing to be recouped."' 55 As of October 27, 2012, 365 total games had
154. See Jeglic, supra note 1.
155. See Strang, supra note 67.
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been cancelled, which was estimated to cost the League $720
million.156
Lockouts have the potential of deterring passionate and loyal fans
from supporting the League.157 The NHL was able to recover and
increase revenues after the 2004-2005 lockout for various reasons.
The emergence of two young superstars, Sidney Crosby and Alexan-
der Ovechkin, as well as the addition of the Winter Classic, helped
generate new excitement.158 However, the League cannot count on
such innovative changes in the future in order to regenerate excite-
ment after lockouts.
The cancellation of the 2012-2013 Winter Classic alone could have
drastic effects on the NHL's relationship with its fans and potential for
revenue growth.159 An estimated $15 million in revenue was lost as a
result of the event's cancellation. 6 0 Further, the popularity of the
Winter Classic is on par with the popularity of the Stanley Cup Finals,
even though the Winter Classic is just another regular season game.16'
David Carter, the Executive director of the University of Southern
California's Sports Business Institute stated, "[b]y cancelling the
game, both hard-core and casual fans will revisit their interest and fu-
ture spending on the game. This . . . affects the rest of the industry
because the more disenfranchised fans become the longer it will take
the NHL to rebuild its fan bases."1 62
An increase in fan knowledge and awareness of collective bargain-
ing issues poses the threat of many fans no longer supporting the
League if lockouts continue.163 As the 2012-2013 lockout concluded,
NHL executives began acknowledging bringing fans back would be "a
156. Sam Carchidi, NHL Cancels November Schedule Because of Lockout, PHILLY.COM (Oct.
27, 2012), available at http://articles.philly.com/2Ol2-10-27/sports/3 4 7654 94 _1_winter-classic-divi-
sion-rivals-six-times-owners-claim.
157. Terry Davidson, Fans' Love Affair With NHL on the Rocks, SUN News (Dec. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.sunnewsnetwork.ca/sunnews/sports/archives/ 2 012 /12 /2 0 121210-190206.
html
158. Erin Ford Cozens, "The World's Greatest Fans": The State of the 2012 NHL Lockout,
CENTER IOR THE Sruov OF SPORTS AND LEISURE IN SOCImTY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://csslsblog.
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battle."16 4 One Canadian report taken while the 2012-2013 lockout
was underway confirmed this proposition.165 A recent poll indicated
that seventy-six percent of Canadians identify themselves as hockey
fans.166 Almost half of those fans said that "they would be less likely
to attend a game as a result of the [2012-2013] lockout."I 6 7 An em-
ployee of the company that conducted the survey added that "[t]here
is a sizable group of fans who are so mad at what's happened, and
these are people who probably love the sport. They are just so frus-
trated and upset ... there may be consequences for the league that are
long term after this, because it's the second lockout in a short period
of time and this one has gone on longer." 168
While NHL executives may have acknowledged that bringing back
fans would be "a battle," the League appears unwilling to make any
effort to regain fan support.169 Rather than taking steps in order to
repair the relationship the League has with its passionate fan base, at
the conclusion of the 2012-2013 lockout, many NHL franchises de-
cided to raise ticket prices, providing yet another incentive for fans to
boycott the league.170 Perhaps this is one way for many teams to re-
cover lost revenue resulting from the lockout, but how can the NHL
expect to regain fan support when after cancelling months of games,
the League asks for fans to pay more money for tickets than ever
before?
In addition to losing fan support, the NHL also faces the risk of
losing crucial sponsors.171 McDonald's, for example, intended to be
one of the NHL's primary sponsors for marketing the Winter Classic,
All-Star game, and other events.172 However, once the lockout began,
McDonald's signed a two-year deal with the NFL instead.173 Further,
Brian Cooper, president of S&E Sponsorship Group, estimated that
164. Scott Burnside, The Lockout and the Damage Done, ESPN (Jan. 6, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://
espn.go.com/nhl/story/jlid/8817964/nhl-lockout-but-damage-done-irreparable (quoting an NHL
executive who stated, "[w]e have a lot of goodwill to make up. People are really disappointed in
us. We need some real good things to give them cause to come back in the arena.").
165. See Davidson, supra note 157.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Burnside, supra note 164.
170. Jon Greenberg, NHL Raises Ticket Prices, ESPN (Feb. 14, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://espn.
go.com/nhl/story/-/id/8945052/nhl-ticket-price-hike-surpasses-other-leagues (stating after the
2012-2013 lockout, the NHL raised ticket prices at a higher rate than the MLB, NFL, and NBA
for the second consecutive year).
171. See Burnside, supra note 164.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the Winter Classic has roughly $3-million in corporate sponsorships.17 4
David Carter added, "[sponsors] have other avenues to reach consum-
ers and you can bet they are determining how best to retrench."175 It
is hard to imagine sponsors continuing to commit millions of dollars to
a League that allows its signature regular season event to be
cancelled.
Lockouts also pose a serious risk in impeding momentum the
League has gained in non-traditional hockey markets, such as Los An-
geles and Florida.1 7 6 Following the Los Angeles Kings' Stanley Cup
title in 2011-2012, the Kings sold an "unprecedented" amount of tick-
ets for the 2012-2013 season.' 77 However, the Kings may have a hard
time regaining fan interest in a crowded Los Angeles sports market
that includes the Lakers, Clippers, Dodgers, and Galaxy, all of whom
have enjoyed recent success and attention.'78 In addition, the Florida
Panthers won the Southeast Division for the first time in franchise
history in 2011-2012 and ticket sales were the highest they had been in
seven years. 17 9 Each lockout makes it more challenging for these
franchises to win back the attention of their fans.
B. Impact of Lockouts on Players
In addition to the billions of dollars in revenue that is lost as a result
of lockouts, the livelihoods of the players are severely impacted. Fol-
lowing the 1994-1995 season, two of Canada's eight NHL franchises
relocated to cities in the United States, as a result of decreased fan
support following the lockout, causing players to move to another
country. 80 Further, because NHL players are not paid during lock-
outs, many players turn to professional hockey leagues in other coun-
tries in order to make money. s However, not all NHL players are
able to do so.18 2 Lockouts force some players, such as Phoenix
Coyotes forward Paul Bissonnette, to ponder how they will make a
174. See Shoalts, supra note 159.
175. Id.
176. Mike Halford, So.. Will the Fans Come Back?, NBC SPoRTs: PRoHOCKEYTALK (Jan. 6,
2013, 3:23 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2013/01/06/so-will-the-fans-come-back/.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Horowitz, supra note 52.
181. Jeff Z. Klein, As N.H. L. Lockout Begins, So Does a Likely Exodus of Players to Europe,
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 16, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/sports/hockey/nhl-
lockout-comes-as-some-players-go-to-skate-in-european-leagues.html?-r=O.
182. Jason Gregor, Inactivity During Lockout a Bane For Most NHL Goalies, EDMONTON
JOURNAL (Nov. 11, 2012), available at http://www.edmontonjournal.com/sports/Inactivity+dur-
ing+lockout+bane+most+goalies/7532916/story.html.
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living if and when they are no longer able to make a living playing in
the NHL.183 In addition, the inactivity of players during the lockout is
likely to negatively impact their on-ice performance once games
resume.184
Players that do find other playing jobs typically sign contracts with
European teams that allow the players to return to the NHL as soon
as a new collective bargaining agreement is reached.' 85 In doing so,
players must leave their families behind, live in unfamiliar places for
an indefinite period of time, and, in most cases, make much less
money than they would in the NHL.186
While some NHL players are able to find work in Europe, other
NHL players are forced to retire.' 87 After the 2004-2005 lockout,
many prominent NHL players never played another game.188 This list
includes Scott Stevens, Mark Messier, Ron Francis, and Adam
Oates. 189 While every player loses the ability to play another season,
such prolific NHL players are denied one final "farewell" season. 190
Minor league hockey player Stephen Gionta noted "Scott Stevens ...
never played another game after the last lockout and that's unfortu-
nate because he was such an instrumental guy in the league. He didn't
get the right sendoff in his career."191 Star players who might have
retired if the 2012-2013 lockout resulted in the cancellation of the en-
tire season include Teemu Selanne and Jaromir Jagr.192 As a result of
these issues, the players themselves, in addition to the NHL as a
whole, have an incentive to implement mandatory binding arbitration
in order to prevent lockouts.
183. Joe Yerdon, Lockout Provides Biz Nasty With Reality Check, NBC Svoars: PROHOCK-
iYTALK (Nov. 14, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2012/11/14/lockout-pro-
vides-biz-nasty-with-a-reality-check/ (discussing the reality check that "fringe" NHL players are
experiencing as a result of the threat of a lengthy lockout effecting their ability to make a living
playing in the NHL).
184. Id.
185. See Klein, supra note 181.
186. Id.
187. Rich Chere, NHL Lockout: If Season Lost, Some Players' NHL Careers Will Be Over,
NJ.com (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.nj.com/devils/index.ssf/2012/12/nhljlockoutsea-
son needs to be.htm.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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C. Impact of Lockouts on Third Parties
While players and owners are adversely impacted by ongoing lock-
outs, the NHL should also take notice of the effect lockouts have on
third parties. Businesses located around NHL arenas that rely on
games being played in order to attract customers lose a significant
amount of revenue when games are not played.'93 These businesses
include sports paraphernalia vendors, bars, restaurants, and compa-
nies that advertise through NHL franchises.194
The city of Boston provides a perfect example of the negative im-
pact lockouts can have on third parties. Boston Bruins home games
generate significant revenue to local businesses located outside of the
arena.0 5 Each Boston Bruins home game is estimated to be worth up
to $1 million in revenue to local businesses.196 Restaurants located
near the arena in Pittsburgh are no different. Restaurant owner Dave
Sypherd stated that Penguins games account for seventy percent of his
restaurant's business.'97 When explaining the impact the 2004-2005
lockout had on his business, Sypherd stated, "I am still paying for it
now." 198 Another Pittsburgh restaurant owner added, "there are defi-
nitely other victims to this besides the players and the owners."1 99
Businesses in Canada are adversely affected as well. 200 NHL
memorabilia shop manager Santana Enrique was "suffering" as a re-
sult of the 2012-2013 lockout. 201 Enrique stated "it's worthless with-
out the Canadiens and no hockey . . . People have stopped buying
NHL gear."202
193. See Ryan Dadoun, NHL Memorabilia Shop Manager "Suffering" Because of Lockout,
NBC SPoRTs: PRoHOCKEYTALK (Oct. 13, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/
2012/10/13/nhl-memorabilia-shop-manager-suffering-because-of-lockout/; see also James Brooks,
An NHL Lockout Could Hurt Bruins-Based Business Far Beyond the Garden, Bos rON BUSIN-SS
JOURNAL (Sept. 10, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blogbottomline/2012/
09/boston-bruins-nhl-lockout.htmlpage=all (discussing how businesses located around the Bos-
ton Garden are economically impacted by the NHL lockout).
194. See Dadoun, supra note 193.
195. See Brooks, supra note 193.
196. Id.
197. Mark Belko, NHL Lockout is Bad News for Businesses Near Consol, PrrSBURGH POST-
GAZETIE (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-
city/nhl-lockout-is-bad-news-for-businesses-near-consol-656250/.
198. Id.
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200. See Dadoun, supra note 193.
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While business owners suffer from the NHL's work stoppages,
many NHL employees have lost their jobs altogether.203 The Florida
Panthers and Ottawa Senators both publically announced layoffs as a
result of the 2012-2013 lockout. 204 Many other NHL teams stated
that while they did not currently plan on making staff adjustments as a
result of the lockout, some hinted that changes could have occurred if
the lockout continued.205
During the early stages of the 2012-2013 lockout, U.S. senators
took notice of the drastic effects NHL lockouts have on third par-
ties.206 In an attempt to facilitate the negotiation process, New Jersey
U.S. Senators Frank Lautenberg and Robert Menendez sent a letter
to Gary Bettman and Donald Fehr, which expressed many of these
economic concerns. 207 The letter states, among other things, that "[a]
delayed or canceled regular season would be a major setback for New-
ark, [New Jersey]. It could mean millions of dollars in lost economic
activity, and more people out of work when [New Jersey's] state un-
employment rate is already at a 30-year high." 208 In an attempt to
provide further incentive for the parties to come to an agreement, the
letter also argues that the Senate has jurisdiction over the issue.209
However, the attempts of the senators had no impact, as the NHL
began cancelling regular season games soon after the existence of the
letter was reported. 210
Businesses survive on their ability to retain customers, maintain
professional relationships with employees, and help facilitate the
economy and well being of outsiders around them. The NHL is no
different. The League simply cannot continue to endure one lockout
after another and expect to receive the support and attention the
NHL needs in order to survive. Therefore, the players and owners
must agree to implement mandatory binding arbitration into the col-
lective bargaining process in order to prevent future lockouts. In do-
ing so, the NHL would preserve the relationships it relies on in order
203. Tim Reynolds, Panthers Announce Layoffs, Blame "Work Stoppage", YAHoo! SeoRTS
(Sep. 18, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/panthers-lay-employees-blame-work-stop-
page (explaining recent staff adjustments taken by the Florida Panthers as a result of the 2012
lockout).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. John Brennan, NJ Senators to NHL: End the Lockout, RECORD (Oct. 1, 2012, 1:45 PM),
http:/Iblog.northjersey.com/meadowlandsmatters/3685/nj-senators-to-nhi-end-the-lockoutl.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Carchidi, supra note 156.
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to continue to be one of the most successful sports leagues in North
America.
IV. CONCLUSION
The NHL cannot allow unnecessary and lengthy collective bargain-
ing disputes to continue to infringe upon the operation of the League.
The NHL's unprecedented amount of collective bargaining disputes
demonstrates that the collective bargaining process must be amended.
Mandatory binding arbitration is the answer.
Mandatory binding arbitration would facilitate communication be-
tween Gary Bettman and Donald Fehr, who appear entirely unwilling
to cooperate with one another. Rather than refusing to negotiate,
mandatory binding arbitration forces the parties to either reach an
agreement on their own, or allow their dispute to be determined by a
neutral third party arbitrator. Either way, future lockouts would be
entirely avoided. It is time league owners and players realize the se-
vere consequences lockouts have and implement mandatory binding
arbitration in order to preserve the integrity, growth, and existence of
the National Hockey League.
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